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Psychoanalysis as Decolonial Judaism 
 
Abstract 
In some recent work on decolonization, there has been an attempt to claim some Jewish 
writers of the twentieth century as participating in a rethinking of “barbarism” that aligns 
Jewish thought with the decolonial movement. This is problematic, especially because post-
Shoah and Zionist discourses have positioned Jews normatively as part of European 
“civilization” opposed to barbarism. Nevertheless, the reclaiming of a radical Jewish tradition 
allied with other movements of the oppressed may provide resources for “barbaric thinking,” 
using “barbaric” here in the positive sense to mean that which confronts the hegemony of 
European colonial thought. The relative absence of psychoanalysis from this discussion is 
striking. Given the place of psychoanalysis both as a “colonial” discipline and as a 
contributor to critical and postcolonial thought, can it be seen in the positive tradition of 
Jewish barbarism? This article offers an account of Jewish barbaric possibilities and suggests 
ways in which psychoanalysis might connect with them. 
 






I found myself thinking about “Jewish barbarism” in a moment of embarrassment. Planning a 
short series of lectures on critical theory, I decided to present two talks drawing on Jewish 
texts. One of them offers a contemporary reading of a Biblical passage and two Yiddish 
stories, and the other discusses one of Emmanuel Levinas’ (1990) “Talmudic readings” as a 
route into considering questions of forgiveness following the perpetration of violence (Frosh, 
2019). My use of these texts is positive, in a way celebratory, and demonstrates my personal 
investment in them and in some of the traditions of Jewish thought, traditions which are 
varied and heterogeneous, just as we Jews are not all the same. My embarrassment was a 
concern over whether, in doing this, I would be retreating from a more critical engagement 
with contemporary progressive ideas, particularly around postcolonial and decolonial 
interventions in the academy, and instead reiterating a rather tired trope in which Jewish 
intellectualism stands in for radical thinking and occludes the new, vibrant, and necessary 
voices from the so-called “periphery.” But then I glanced at the British newspapers and the 
extraordinary prominence of concern over antisemitism both in the UK and (possibly with 
different dynamics) in Europe; and then too, I thought about those definitely “critical” Jewish  
thinkers, Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and maybe Theodor Adorno, as well as, in the 
contemporary scene, the luminous social philosopher Judith Butler. Maybe my initial 
reticence could be construed as a kind of “internalized antisemitism,” an apologetic attitude 
that reads Jewishness through the eyes of those who disparage it rather than through its own 
rich resources? My embarrassment would therefore be shameful, failing to appreciate the 
creativity of Jewish tradition.  
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Note, however, whatever his wider ambivalence towards Jews, that Frantz Fanon 
(1952/1967) – more or less ubiquitous in postcolonial and decolonial writings – was quite 
clear on the parallels and necessary alliances amongst victims of different forms of racism:  
It was my philosophy professor, a native of the Antilles, who recalled the fact to me one 
day: ‘Whenever you hear anyone abuse the Jews, pay attention, because he is talking 
about you.’ And I found that he was universally right—by which I meant that I was 
answerable in my body and in my heart for what was done to my brother. Later I realized 
that he meant, quite simply, an anti-Semite is inevitably anti-Negro. (p. 92) 
Admittedly, the last sentence of this quotation gives pause in that it suggests that the alliance 
between black people and Jews might be merely contingent – the same people hate them. 
Indeed, it is clear that Fanon himself, however universally minded he might have been in 
Black Skin, White Masks, held ambivalent views about the relationship between the victims 
of what he called “Negrophobia” and those of antisemitism. On the one hand, the oppression 
of the Jew demands solidarity: “Anti-Semitism hits me head-on: I am enraged” (p. 65). On 
the other, whilst Fanon sees parallels, he notes the differences in the phenomenology of these 
different forms of racism. Jews are discriminated against because of their assumed intellect 
and the plotting they supposedly do to support one another to gain leverage; blacks, on the 
other hand, are feared sensually. This set of associations has some problematic consequences, 
even though it has resonance in the contemporary appreciation that different discriminatory 
acts and prejudicial attitudes need to be understood in their specificity as well as what they 
share (Young-Bruehl, 1996). For instance, it feeds into Fanon’s (1952/1967) rather strange 
notion that the Jews are hated in a “general” or even “rational” way (“Anti-Semitism can be 
rationalized on a basic level. It is because he takes over the country that the Jew is a danger”) 
whilst “Negrophobia” is “to be found on an instinctual, biological level” (pp.123–4). The 
biological nature of anti-black racism means that the black is attacked in “his corporeality” 
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(p. 126) – lynched, for instance – whereas “the Jew is attacked in his religious identity, in his 
history, in his race, in his relations with his ancestors and with his posterity” (pp.125–6), 
though this too can also involve the Jew being “killed or sterilized” (p. 125), which certainly 
sounds corporeal. In the end, the Jew might be white, or at least he can pass as such, whereas 
the black subject is trapped in the skin of one who will always attract attention.  
He is a white man, and, apart from some rather debatable characteristics, he can 
sometimes go unnoticed. He belongs to the race of those who since the beginning of time 
have never known cannibalism. […] Granted, the Jews are harassed—what am I thinking 
of? They are hunted down, exterminated, cremated. But these are little family quarrels. 
The Jew is disliked from the moment he is tracked down. But in my case everything 
takes on a new guise. I am given no chance. I am overdetermined from without. I am the 
slave not of the ‘idea’ that others have of me but of my own appearance. (p. 87) 
Describing being ‘exterminated, [and] cremated’ as ‘little family quarrels’ does not invite 
solidarity amongst different oppressed groups, even allowing for Fanon’s sometimes ironic 
tone. As Brian Cheyette (2013) explains, however, there is more to Fanon’s wavering 
position (alliance versus differentiation) than ironic provocation. “The references to Jews and 
anti-Semitism in Black Skin, White Masks,” Cheyette argues, are “part of a wider tension 
concerning the relationship between a particularist anti-colonial nationalism (which excludes 
‘the Jew’) and more universalist or cosmopolitan theories of racial oppression (which include 
‘the Jew’)” (p. 61). This may be one of the most significant areas of uncertainty around 
Jewish incorporation into the decolonial struggle and also raises a general question about the 
multidimensionality of that struggle: Is every specific group defined through a process of 
national self-determination, or is the core revolutionary, decolonial move that of banding 
together as oppressed all people aiming to overthrow colonialism? If the former, then we 
need to acknowledge that, despite fervent and often antagonistic debates about the nature of 
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Zionism in the period up until the Second World War amongst critical intellectuals (Scholem, 
Buber and Benjamin amongst others), as well as  religious versus secular Jews (the former 
often being anti-Zionist), plus the continuing presence of non-Zionists and anti-Zionists who 
nevertheless identify as Jews, the route most Jews have taken is towards attachment to the 
State of Israel (e.g. Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 2004) – sometimes wholly supportively, 
sometimes critically in relation to the policies of Israeli governments. This has posed huge 
obstacles to their incorporation into the decolonial movement, which has been very strongly 
aligned with the Palestinian cause and is often anti-Zionist. And if, alternatively, 
decolonization focuses on the solidarity of the oppressed, what about the issue of 
“whiteness”? Are Jews “white” and can they pass as such in the way Fanon imagines, or does 
the periodic recrudescence of antisemitism suggest that assimilation to whiteness is unstable 
and insecure? Fanon wavers, but the wavering is not just his issue; and maybe all that can be 
said at this point is that the assertion that anti-black racism is distinct from antisemitism is 
well founded, just as is the recognition that “an anti-Semite is inevitably anti-Negro” (Fanon, 
1952/1967, p. 92). 
For its reciprocation of the compliment that the hero of decolonial thought possibly saw Jews 
as his co-persecuted compatriots, recall Levinas’ (1978/1999) famous French dedication to 
Otherwise than Being, which has been translated as “to the memory of those who were 
closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on 
millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the 
same anti-semitism.” The same hatred, the same antisemitism – unity in suffering, and hence, 
one might hope, in opposition to oppression. In some ways, this is accentuated by the book’s 
second dedication, which Annabel Herzog (2005) presents as untranslatable by those outside 
the comity of the Jewish people: a Hebrew language dedication that is specific and personal, 
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that names the “closest among the six million” as six individuals from Levinas’ family killed 
by the Nazis. Herzog explains: 
The Hebrew sentences follow a traditional phraseology and dedicate [Otherwise than 
Being] to the memory of Levinas’s father, mother, brothers, and father and mother in-
law, who are all recalled by their names in the following order: Yehiel, son of Avraham 
Halevi; Devorah, daughter of Moshe; Dov, son of Yehiel Halevi; Amminadav, son of 
Yehiel Halevi; Shemuel, son of Gershon Halevi; and Malka, daughter of Hayyim. The 
National-Socialists are not mentioned, as are neither the millions of victims of all 
nations, the hatred of the other man, or anti-Semitism. The second dedication expresses a 
particular and intimate remembrance of people and events that we, the readers, cannot 
share. (p. 342) 
Herzog suggests that what is taken to be an “immemorial” memory of the general is more 
accessible than the personal memory that Levinas gives us – we cannot know exactly what 
these names mean, nor to whom they refer in the detail of their lives. Still, is it really the case 
that we cannot enter into the particularity of another’s experience in this way, whether or not 
we share their background or social identity? Knowing the Jewish liturgy, I recognize 
Levinas’ use of the traditional forms of memorializing to honour his family members. But, 
even if I did not know this, and even if I required a translation from the Hebrew to make the 
text accessible (just as I might require a translation of the first dedication from the French) – 
and granted that I can never fully know the lives of these people in the way that Levinas 
himself might have done – it is surely possible and ethically essential to respond to something 
here. These personal losses are neither unique nor unimaginable, and might have fuelled 
Levinas at moments when he moved away from the particularity into which he sometimes fell 
(the Jewish people as singularly chosen) and saw every one of the oppressed, of all faiths and 
all nations, as victims of “the same anti-semitism.”  
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And then there is the comment by Edward Said, scholar, polemicist, and author both of 
Orientalism and Zionism From the Point of View of its Victims (Said, 1978, 1979), to an 
Israeli journalist, Ari Shavit (2000), who had said to him that he sounded “very Jewish”: “Of 
course. I’m the last Jewish intellectual. You don’t know anyone else. All your other Jewish 
intellectuals are now suburban squires. From Amos Oz to all these people here in America. 
So I’m the last one. The only true follower of Adorno. Let me put it this way: I’m a Jewish-
Palestinian.” The context for this was a hard-hitting interview demanding Israelis face their 
responsibility for Palestinian suffering, so it should not be read as a generous offer of 
alliance, but rather as a criticism of all the other, failed “Jewish intellectuals.” Nevertheless, it 
rescues something from the debris: the idea of the Jewish intellectual, the “true follower of 
Adorno.” Despite the irony that Adorno was not “technically” Jewish, Said’s assertion makes 
an important gesture towards a Jewish offering, one which is universalized here in the person 
of the Palestinian-American intellectual. 
That is where the discomfort at the embarrassment comes in: Why should I be embarrassed at 
trying to resurrect this history, and not now even as a “non-Jewish Jew” (Deutscher, 
1968/2017) but as someone committed to my Jewishness and willing to use “classical” texts 
to assert it? After all, if both Fanon and Said have some time for Jewish identities, who am I 
to be apologetic – and at this time too, when so much seems to depend on asserting that 
antisemitism is a form of racism, and is not somehow exempt from the anti-racist activist 
critique? So, no embarrassment now, or at least I will try to offer something that makes these 
universalizing links, yet is also rooted in my particularism, and I will try not to be ashamed. 
Mixed up in this is something else: the issue of psychoanalysis, its Jewishness, its 
colonialism, its universalist claims, its specificities, its blind spots and its potential. If I want 
to assert an alliance between Jewish and decolonizing theory, a rendering of critical theory 
that is both “Jewish” and decolonial, then psychoanalysis – after all, a profound influence on 
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Adorno and Butler, if not so much (but not negligibly) on Walter Benjamin – should offer 
something. I hope so; but let’s see. The place to begin, in any case, is with barbarism. 
Barbaric Jews 
 
One way of reading some of Freud’s more compellingly unfortunate remarks, couched in the 
language of colonialism, is as part of an effort to place black Africans and indigenous 
Australians in the place of the “other” to white Europeans, previously largely occupied by 
Jews. There is little need to reproduce these remarks here (see Frosh, 2013, 2017), other than 
to remind ourselves of the division proposed by Freud, especially in Totem and Taboo, 
between the world of the “savage” and that of the “civilized” – meaning, generally speaking, 
European men (Freud, 1913/1955). That Freud should write in this way is not surprising, 
given the European colonial present of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As 
Said (2003) notes, the strangeness of the “non-European” other was in some ways simply the 
converse of Freud’s immersion in the received history of European civilization, deriving from 
the Greeks and Romans as well as from the Bible (p. 16). Yet, as Said also points out, Freud 
had an intriguing understanding of the “semite,” with whom he identified at least part of the 
time, as the opponent of the European – or at least of the Christian. The famous place where 
this occurs is in the passage in The Interpretation of Dreams where Freud (1900/1953) is 
recollecting his father’s “unheroic conduct” in the face of a Christian antisemite who knocks 
his expensive (Jewish) fur hat into the gutter (p. 197). Freud links this event with his 
identification with the “Carthaginian general” Hannibal, who had been made by his father to 
swear revenge on the Romans; and then traces further back into childhood his liking for 
Napoleon’s “Jewish” marshals. Said (2003) comments, “Reading Moses and Monotheism, 
one is struck by Freud’s almost casual assumption (which also applies to Hannibal) that 
Semites were most certainly not European […] and, at the same time, were somehow 
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assimilable to its culture as former outsiders” (pp. 15–16). This last point is an important 
marker of a kind of wished-for shift in Jewish identity towards Europeanism, but Freud’s 
association of semites with non-Europeans is a significant one not only for Said, but for 
Freud himself. Sander Gilman (1993) has perhaps made most of this, arguing that Freud was 
largely responding to the widespread antisemitic tropes of his time that feminized Jews as 
“castrated” as a consequence of circumcision and associated them with blackness and 
primitivity. It should be recalled here that many of these tropes linked Jews and “savages,” 
perhaps most especially – pace Fanon – cannibals. Marita Vyrgioti (2018), studying the place 
of cannibalism in psychoanalysis, comments on the currency of this at that time, and its very 
material effects on the lives of European Jews in the form of public “ritual murder” trials. She 
concludes that “the cannibal fantasies projected on Jewish communities exposed financial, 
cultural, social, and religious anxieties and informed the anti-Semitic imagery of a people 
which live among us, eat our flesh, and suck our (Christian) blood” (p. 45, emphasis in 
original). Responding insouciantly to this, in Moses and Monotheism Freud (1939/1964) 
explains how the invention of the monotheistic God by the Jews is a step forward for 
civilization, because it requires an act of intellect and an escape from sensuality. Christianity 
is then a regression to the more material, even “feminine” practices that require visible icons, 
whilst Christians are at times barely disguised barbarians. “We must not forget,” Freud wrote, 
“that all those peoples who excel to-day in their hatred of Jews became Christians only in late 
historic times, often driven to it by bloody coercion. It might be said that they are all ‘mis-
baptized’. They have been left, under a thin veneer of Christianity, what their ancestors were, 
who worshipped a barbarous polytheism” (p. 91). 
The work that is done in this material is certainly a kind of “colonizing,” as Brickman (2003) 
amongst others points out, in which the Jewish other is made European and civilized at the 
expense of the “primitive” other of colonialism. Yet there is also something else at stake here, 
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which takes off from the reference to the “barbarous” in the previous quotation. The work 
that Freud does to reposition Jewishness as civilized and European is necessary precisely 
because of the haunting of the European vision of Jewish identity by its opposite, indeed by 
the fantasy of “barbarism” that is core to antisemitic discourse – as opposed to the real 
barbarism demonstrated by antisemites in Freud’s day and especially just after his death in 
1939. Freud objected to the association of Jewishness with barbarism, despite his liking for 
Hannibal: for him, Jewish identity offered a high ethical ideal, a point he made several times, 
for example in his famous letter to the Vienna Bnai Brith (Freud, 1926/1961). But not only is 
this objection coincident with a view of non-Jewish (“Christian”) civilization as itself largely 
“barbarous”; one might also argue that Freud’s central perception, the existence of an 
unconscious life in each human subject, however civilized they might claim to be, is 
testimony to the presence of barbarism everywhere – and not just as something to be 
overcome. To put this more delicately: Freud’s rhetoric has some significant “political” 
effects. First, it shifts the location of barbarism away from the Jew and into the colonized 
black, thus buying into the colonial mindset; but contrastingly, it places barbarism in non-
Jewish (specifically Christian) Europe itself. However, it also offers scope for a revaluing of 
barbarism as resistive of conventional order and hence potentially liberating. This relies on 
the idea that the universal presence of a “primitive” unconscious amongst humans makes the 
barbaric mobile and formative. What is taken to be the civilized norm – that of colonial 
rationality – is underpinned by the hugely potent, repressed yet disruptive forces that lie at its 
heart. If the Jews are linked to these forces, being supposedly barbaric, then Jewishness and 
“savagery” are to be taken seriously as positions for conjoined opposition to the dominant 
colonial order. 
In his exuberant study of “decolonial Judaism,” Santiago Slabodsky (2014) discusses various 
ways in which it might make sense to read Jewishness as “barbaric.” His first move is to 
11 
 
establish the historical association between Jewish barbarism and other “barbarians” within 
the discourse of European identity and of whiteness in general.  
For most of the modern period, European discourses portrayed Jews as non-Westerners. 
While the descriptions varied depending on geopolitical context, normative descriptions 
of Jews often oscillated between assimilable primitivity and irremediable barbarity. The 
specific narrative of Jewish barbarism proved particularly persistent across time, space, 
and ideological persuasion. Even champions of liberal values […] considered Jews a 
threat to civilization and permanently interrelated them to other barbarians of the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic including Muslims, Subsaharan Africans and Amerindians. 
These discourses regularly posited Jewish masterminding of and participation in plots to 
destroy European civilization, whether defined as Christendom or capitalist imperialism. 
(p. 4) 
Slabodsky notes how much this perception has shifted since the end of the Second World 
War (although the antisemitic claim that Jews sponsor the Muslim “invasion” of the West is 
still current), in light of both the Shoah and the foundation and increasing normalization of 
the State of Israel. Nowadays, it is much harder to think of Jews as aligned with the 
subordinated other, yet this history is a profound one. It is even true in Europe after 
Emancipation, which we should recall came late and only tentatively. For instance, in 
Austria, access to citizenship for Jews was only made official during Freud’s childhood in 
1867, beginning a process of dissolution of Jewish community life that nevertheless refused 
Jews full entry to the society into which they were supposedly assimilating. Enzo Traverso 
(2016) comments that “[t]his is the source of the mixture of particularism and 
cosmopolitanism that characterizes Jewish modernity,” (p. 9) – a creatively fertile mix, it is 
true, but always an uncomfortable one verging on the edge of exclusion. It did not in any case 
take long for their rights to be rescinded in the most dramatic and thoroughgoing way, in the 
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treatment of Jews not just as barbarians, but beasts and vermin. But amongst the important 
issues here is that with the rise in “racial” antisemitism, Jewish barbarism became 
incorrigible: that is, conversion to Christianity would no longer solve the Jewish problem, as 
Jews remained Jews whatever their formal religious status. This shift was not unheralded: 
after all, one point of the Inquisition was to chase after “New Christians” who remained 
Jewish in their beliefs and secret practices even after supposed conversion. Nevertheless, it 
was radically different in scale and severity – there was now nothing that a Jew could do to 
become civilized. The more that Jews might try to do so, the more pernicious they appeared: 
a secret conspiracy to undermine European civilization on behalf of the barbarian hordes 
lurking at the gate.  
The idea of barbarism as developed by Slabodsky is binary and in some ways categorical, 
opposing the barbaric to the civilized rather than, for instance, working with the notions of 
hybridity that have been more characteristic of postcolonial and diasporic studies. This 
binarism has its difficulties, not least that Jewish “cosmopolitanism” has always been linked 
with absorption of the influences of surrounding cultures and has often included 
incorporation of Western classicism as well as Jewish texts and traditions. Nevertheless, 
Slabodsky presses for barbarism as an oppositional response to the coercive power of 
Western colonialism, incorporating Jews along with other colonized subjects. Distinguishing 
“border thinking,” a notion developed by Walter Mignolo (2000), from hybridity and playing 
on the image of the marrano – originally a term of abuse for “New Christians” or conversos 
deliberately mobilized here as antagonistic to the colonial (and Christian) norm – Slabodsky 
(2014) asserts the resistive power of the colonized other as something to be sought out and 
catalyzed: “The marrano does not prevail over the dualism like a hybrid but reacts creatively 
to this imperially-imposed identity,” he writes (p. 34). Whereas the hybrid “attempts to 
undermine colonial dualism by dissolving identities,” the border thinker “creatively develops 
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identities, even if these identities turn upside down the reified imperial constructions” (p. 35). 
In practice, this means taking the elements written off by the colonial “empire” as barbaric 
and empowering them, disrupting the colonial project. Jews are potentially as much part of 
this as any other colonized group, because colonialism has made them the same. The 
European Enlightenment did this by presenting Jews as the outmoded barbarians of reason – 
a direct inheritance of the supersessionism of the Church, in which Christianity is taken to 
have displaced Judaism, leaving the unconverted Jews as primitive relics. There is also 
another historical link, arising as much from the colonized South as from Europe itself, but 
feeding the colonial imagination in a way that is not much attended to. Slabodsky notes how 
from the sixteenth century Amerindians were identified as Jews, with the emergence of 
writings “detailing the commonalities between Natives and Jews. In particular, the 
accusations focus on cannibalism, sexual perversion, lust, and, most importantly, anarchical 
and seditious political behaviour” (p. 60). More generally, “[f]rom the dawn of modernity in 
the seventeenth century until the Holocaust in the twentieth century, the narrative of 
barbarism made Jews and Blacks political co-conspirators using political and sexual 
perversion to subvert coloniality’s structures of domination” (p. 62).  
There are various ways in which this narrative of barbarism might be utilized for oppositional 
practice. Slabodsky’s main structural division is between those Jewish writers and thinkers 
who regard barbarism as a “negative” but displace it from Jews and the colonized 
“barbarians” to European civilization; and those who take ownership of barbarianism as a 
positive alternative to the so-called civilization of the West. The former tendency is the 
stronger one amongst European Jewish intellectuals and has an unexpected association with 
Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism. Jacqueline Rose (2011) notes his reference in 
“A Solution of the Jewish Question,” published in The Jewish Chronicle in 1896, to “the 
profound barbarism of our day,” by which, he explains, “I mean anti-Semitism.” Rose 
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comments, “[l]ong before the horrors of the Second World War will offer its deadly 
confirmation to his insight, Herzl has more or less stated that barbarism – like partition, we 
can say – originates in the West” (p. 73). Herzl’s solution was Zionism; in other cases, Jewish 
texts are drawn on and presented as the genuinely civilized alternative to European 
barbarism. In this, we might see a move away from a view of Jewish critical fervour as 
arising mainly as a response to antisemitism. Instead, Jewishness is seen to have its own 
dynamic of critical engagement with the social order, with its social practices, traditions, and 
texts being mined for insights into how to build a good society. Arguably, this is precisely the 
task that the rabbis of the Talmudic period set themselves as they discussed the meaning of 
Biblical texts and developed commentaries that offered spiritual, legal, and practical guidance 
for Jewish communities. It might also be seen as part of the “Jewish” project of some more 
contemporary writers, for example Judith Butler – though this is also made more complex by 
Butler’s astute awareness of how making universalizing claims for a Jewish ethics can itself 
reproduce the colonial impulse. Presenting Jewish thought as linked with “alterity,” Butler 
(2012) begins her book on Jewish ethics discussing the move away from “ontology” and 
towards “relationality” that posits the other as central to formations of the human subject, and 
asking “Is this Jewish?” “It establishes the relation to alterity as constitutive of identity, 
which is to say that the relation to alterity interrupts identity, and this interruption is the 
condition of ethical relationality. Is this a Jewish notion? Yes and no” (p. 5, emphasis in 
original). 
“Yes and no” is already a Jewish answer to a question like this! Butler’s claim here is not put 
in terms of barbarism, yet it has some echoes of it: the closed mind of (the) European 
(ontology) is displaced by the more transgressive and open possibilities of the “Jewish” 
emphasis on the interruptive presence of the other. Butler begins this passage with an 
exclamatory moral statement: “Relationality displaces ontology, and it is a good thing too” 
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(p. 5). In this tradition, then, the supposedly barbaric Jew draws on Jewish philosophy to 
offer a critique of the supposedly civilized West, turning the tables just as other barbarisms 
do – the famous but unfortunately probably apocryphal Gandhi quip (Journalist: “What do 
you think of Western civilization?” Gandhi: ‘I think it would be a good idea”) standing in for 
more developed postcolonial argumentation. 
The second strand of barbaric thinking that Slabodsky (2014) outlines is one that retains the 
name-tag of barbarism for the colonized and for the Jew, but reads it positively. Here he 
draws on postcolonial thinkers such as Albert Memmi, a quote from whom begins 
Slabodsky’s book: “I am an incurable barbarian” (p. 1). I am no expert on Memmi and will 
leave the discussion of how best to represent his thinking to others (e.g. Cheyette, 2013), save 
to note that it is clear that he held to a position that rejected assimilation and emphasized the 
contribution of Jews to the broader decolonial movement in the name of his own Jewish 
specificity, however hybrid this might be; and that he argued an important step along the way 
would be to reframe Jewish self-understanding outside antisemitism and instead in 
conjunction with the emerging Africanist movement of the time. Dislocation nevertheless 
remains an important element in this self-understanding; that is, Jews have something to offer 
specifically because of their deracinated position, a position usually seen as antagonistic to 
the rootedness of the civilized subject. Cheyette quotes Memmi as follows: “I was a sort of 
half-breed of colonization, understanding everyone because I belonged completely to no one” 
(p. 51). For Slabodsky (2014), what matters is the triple alienation of Memmi: “a native in a 
colonial country, a Jew in an anti-Semitic universe [and] an African in a world dominated by 
Europe” (p. 128). Note here the resonance with the famous complaint attributed by Alma 
Mahler (1946/1968) to her husband Gustav, half a century earlier: “I am thrice homeless, as a 
native of Bohemia in Austria, as an Austrian among Germans, and as a Jew throughout the 
world. Everywhere an intruder, never welcomed” (p. 109). The nomadic and othered Jew 
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appears here as an affiliate of all homeless or oppressed people, having to find their way 
without ever gaining acceptance. Freud, too, speaking in 1926, had a similar tripartite 
framing of the impact of the excluded Jew, though couched characteristically in a combative 
way: “My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself 
German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of antisemitic prejudice in Germany and 
German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew” (Gay, 1988, p. 448). Mahler, 
of course, converted to Christianity –  a move that Freud always refused to countenance – in 
order to take up the position of Director of the Vienna Opera; but one might argue that the 
recurrence of Jewish themes in Mahler’s music (an example being the appearance of a 
chaotic Klezmer band in the funeral march in the First Symphony) is not only nostalgic, but 
also a way of reminding his cultivated audiences that the barbaric Jewish disruption was still 
around.  
Otherwise to Colonization 
 
We should recall the way Hannah Arendt (1944/2007), prefiguring the “barbarism” 
argument, valorizes the status of the Jew as “pariah.” She distinguishes this from Jewish 
“parvenus,” who identify themselves with their oppressors through assimilation and self-
enrichment (a characterization that laid Arendt open to charges of antisemitism) and in this 
way betray the historical consciousness of the Jews as outsiders. The claim is that their pariah 
status may not be loved by Jews, but it gives them critical leverage that should not be 
discarded; moreover, it requires their willingness to self-address as Jews if it is to be 
materialized in this progressive form. Being on the outside as a pariah gives some kind of 
authority to the Jew and makes it possible to contribute to the wider struggles in the world 
even though, she cannot resist adding, the status of these radical Jews “among their own 
brethren” – the parvenus – is low (p. 276). There is a lot one could say about this (see 
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Stonebridge, 2019), but the issue I want to hold onto here is how pariahs, whatever their 
exclusion from the Jewish “mainstream,” nevertheless register as Jewish in the struggle 
against oppression. In one of her most powerful pieces of writing, the visceral We Refugees, 
Arendt (1943/2007) lambasts the way in which “we” do not want to be Jews. Assimilation 
does not work, as the fate of non-Jewish Jews shows, pushed from one country to the next, 
each time trying to be perfectly German or French, “willing to become loyal Hottentots, only 
to hide the fact that we are Jews” (pp. 271–72). It has never worked, even for the conversos, 
unless they take up cudgels as marranos and barbarians. Arendt’s version of this, articulated 
through a number of exemplary figures, is to emphasize the radical situation of the Jewish 
pariah, indeed to claim everything ethical in Jewish culture and behaviour as being due to that 
state, a claim that might resonate with Said’s assertion of himself, quoted earlier, as “the last 
Jewish intellectual.” Concluding We Refugees, just before her famous statement that at last it 
had become clear that the fate of the nations is tied up with the fate of the Jews (this is 1943), 
Arendt makes this bid for the soul of Jewishness: 
It is the tradition of a minority of Jews who have not wanted to become upstarts, who 
preferred the status of ‘conscious pariah’. All vaunted Jewish qualities – the ‘Jewish 
heart’, humanity, humor, disinterested intelligence – are pariah qualities. All Jewish 
shortcomings – tactlessness, political stupidity, inferiority complexes, and money-
grubbing – are characteristics of upstarts. There have always been Jews who did not 
think it worthwhile to change their humane attitude and their natural insight into reality 
for the narrowness of caste spirit or the essential unreality of financial transactions. (p. 
274) 
The disconcerting reproduction of classical antisemitic tropes in this passage is close to the 
surface, but so is an assertion of Jewish radicalness as a kind of universalist message of 
alliance with others. Arendt’s bitterness is understandable: the “we” in We Refugees was 
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central to her situation. The question is, to quote Butler (2012) again: “Is this a Jewish 
notion? Yes and no” (p. 5). 
Emmanuel Levinas, who appears nowadays in most accounts of “Jewish” philosophy, 
definitely thinks it is. In terms of Butler’s (2012) ontology-relationality division, Levinas 
(1991/1998) is on the side of relationality; indeed, the West’s obsession with ontology is 
what rules it out of an engagement with a truly human ethics – one which acknowledges the 
place of the other and thus moves away from narcissistic self-promotion. The profundity of 
the claim that Levinas makes lies in the way it undermines assumptions of autonomous 
subjecthood and instead makes otherness foundational to the subject, an otherness that is both 
abstract and universal and immediate and personal. Levinasian ethics means we have to 
respond to what he calls “the Face of the Other” (Levinas, 1991/1998, p.104) as the primary 
demand upon us; and this Face is both the immediate other person and the principle that we 
are not the origin of ourselves and therefore are subject to the requirement that we respect the 
differences produced by the heterogeneity of human subjects. So far so good, then, but the 
difficulty is that in some of Levinas’ writing it is not clear that the philosophical requirement 
that the other comes first is followed through politically, particularly when it comes to the 
other who stands outside the Eurocentric norm. Here is a famous problematic formulation, 
linked with Levinas’ resolute support for the State of Israel as both an ethical and a political 
entity, from his paper “Jewish Thought Today,” first published in 1961 (Levinas, 1963/1990, 
p. 164). He has just remarked that “Jewish universalism has always revealed itself in 
particularism. But for the first time in its history, Israeli Judaism gauges its task only by its 
own teachings.” Immediately, however, comes the sting. 
Surely the rise of the countless masses of Asiatic and under-developed peoples threatens 
this new-found authenticity? On to the world stage come peoples and civilizations who 
no longer refer to our Sacred History, for whom Abraham, Isaac and Jacob no longer 
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mean anything. As at the beginning of Exodus, a new king arises who does not know 
Joseph. (p.165) 
It is hard to find excuses for this, or indeed for other places where the Palestinians are 
positioned as Israel’s other, yet excluded from the kind of other that makes demands on the 
subject – that is, refused any Face. The reference to the new king (pharaoh) just makes things 
worse: the Egyptians should have been grateful to the descendants of Joseph, who had saved 
them from famine, but instead turned on them, with disastrous results for themselves. Howard 
Caygill (2002) quotes Levinas in an interview just after the Sabra and Shatila atrocities of 
1982:  
[I]f you’re for the other, you’re for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another 
neighbour or treats him unjustly, then what can you do? Then alterity takes on another 
character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem 
of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are 
people who are wrong. (p. 192)   
For Caygill, this opens up a “wound” in Levinas’ whole system of thought; for Butler (2012), 
it produces a “quandary”: “The fact that the Palestinians remain faceless for him (or that they 
are the paradigm for the faceless) produces a rather stark quandary, since Levinas gives us so 
many reasons to extrapolate politically on the prohibition against killing” (p. 39). 
It is worth noting one complexity in Levinas’ (1963/1990) “countless masses of Asiatic and 
under-developed peoples” passage. This is not to reduce its poison: the phraseology itself, 
plus the subsequent reference to “the greedy eyes of these countless hordes who wish to hope 
and live” (p.165) and the danger that “Jews and Christians are pushed to the margins of 
history” (p.165) is evidence of Levinas’ unwillingness to extend his system of ethics to 
everyone. Yet there is also an acknowledgement that the demands of these “masses” are 
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fuelled by something necessary. “We hear in it,” he writes (p. 165), “the cry of frustrated 
humanity, and while one certainly has the right to denounce one’s own hunger as materialist, 
one never has the right to denounce the hunger of others”. This seems to restore the other, the 
one in need (“frustrated humanity”) as an agency with which the subject (“one”) might 
identify. Slabodsky (2014) makes an additional claim, which is that Levinas’ views changed 
between the earlier work in which the barbarism of the West would be opposed only by 
Judaism, with the “Asiatic and under-developed peoples” dropping off the map of ethical 
responsibility, and his writings from the 1970s onwards which were influenced by his 
engagement with Southern cone thinkers, some but not all of them Jewish. 
Following encounters in the early 1970s, Levinas was challenged by a group of South 
American intellectuals. He then expanded his critique of the West, mobilized the positive 
conception of barbarism from his new conversation partners, and recognized that the 
future of humanity resided in the barbaric margins of the West. He rubricated his turn by 
employing Talmudic texts to explain the need to form a large community of barbarians. 
This new community would be instrumental in challenging criminal imperial formations 
represented symbolically by Rome and contextualized in Europe and the United States. 
(p. 94) 
This supposed shift away from seeing non-European others as a threat and towards locating 
them in the context of an alliance against the West is not without its problems, of course: the 
continuing exceptionalist support for Israel makes the decolonial link unstable, though it is 
worth noting that there are moments in Levinas’ work where the ethical critique of Israel is at 
least strongly implied (Frosh, 2009). Levinas is perhaps trying to balance the argument for 
the special position of the Jew as repository of ethics, along with a political and personal 
commitment to the preservation of the State of Israel, against a universalist philosophy in 
which one has the most responsibility for the other with whom one has no particular 
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connection, or even to whom one is opposed. This is a hard act, complicating any clear 
evaluation. Levinas struggled with recognizing the “countless masses,” but if Slabodsky is 
correct, he also indicated how this struggle could be resolved in a relational rendering of 
otherness that allies all those who are oppressed along with the Jews, in opposition to that 
“same hatred of the other man, the same anti-semitism” (Levinas, 1978/1999). Jewish 
barbarism is the ethically superior position not only because it is relational rather than 
narcissistic; but because it affiliates itself with all the other barbarisms that seek expression, 
recompense, and justice. 
Back to Psychoanalysis 
 
This piece started with Fanon and then Freud and was meant to add psychoanalysis to the mix 
in constructing a Jewish barbarism that is decolonizing in its impulse and effects. Without 
going over this ground in detail again – the Freudian assumption of a bifurcation between 
“primitive” and “civilized” that is subverted by the presence of “primitivity” in the 
unconscious of all “civilized” people, and by a barbarism that hides behind the supposed 
advanced culture of Europe and is easily roused – let us think through the possibility that the 
“Jewishness” of psychoanalysis might have something important to contribute to this 
resistive movement. For one thing, what is this “Jewishness”? Clearly, it is in part a historical 
and sociological statement about psychoanalysis – almost all the originators of 
psychoanalysis were Jewish and for a large part of its history it was dominated by Jews, and 
this had substantial effects both in contributing a critical vision and in generating antisemitic 
attacks on psychoanalysis (Frosh, 2005). The historical record is strong on this, but is that 
enough to claim a psychoanalytic link with the Jewish “barbarism” argued for in this paper? 
Psychoanalysis has had an uncertain history in relation to politics, as in many other things, 
with a strong institutional tendency towards conservatism (e.g. Damousi and Plotkin, 2012) 
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as well as a tradition of radical thought and uses of psychoanalytic theory to fill out 
understandings of resistance and ideology and in some cases to offer models of critical 
mental health practice (Frosh, 2018). Obviously, this paper sides with the radical element in 
psychoanalysis, its capacity to remain at odds with the normatively oppressive values of 
colonialism. Here, the leverage that psychoanalysis has given on analyses of racism is 
relevant, visible in Fanon’s (1952/1967) use of Lacan and Freud, but also in a wide range of 
more contemporary commentaries drawing especially on Kleinian, relational, and Lacanian 
traditions (Frosh, 2013). In addition, the recent applications of psychoanalysis in postcolonial 
theory have been highly creative, albeit at times fraught with contradictions (Greedharry, 
2008). Does this represent the wresting away of psychoanalysis from the limitations of its 
Jewishness to find a more decolonizing setting, or is it a culmination of its Jewish elements 
that makes it a promising ground for decolonial practice? As Jews become more normalized, 
at least for the time being, should psychoanalysis become less “Jewish” in order to maintain 
its radical political edge?  
This seems to me an irresolvable and uncomfortable dilemma, another “yes and no.” 
Nevertheless, I am advocating a reappropriation of the Jewishness of psychoanalysis in the 
context of a “barbaric” response to the living legacy of colonialism and the broader effects of 
social oppression on human lives. For example, Arendt’s (1943/2007) “Jewish pariah” 
qualities of “humanity, humor, [and] disinterested intelligence” are very close to 
psychoanalysis’ “Jewish” ideals – at least of the Freudian kind (p. 274). Diller (1991) quotes 
Ludwig Braun in his speech to the Vienna Bnai Brith honouring Freud’s seventieth birthday 
as portraying psychoanalysis as “genuinely Jewish” and going on “to define the meaning of 
Jewishness as being comprised of an independence of spirit, the willingness to do battle with 
an unjust society, and a vision of the whole of nature and humanity” (p.170). This is a 
universalizing Jewishness with which Freud (1926/1961) felt at home – his return letter 
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quotes his “respect for the so-called ‘ethical’ demands of human civilization” (p. 367) – but it 
also links with the disruptive elements of the revalued barbaric in comparison with the 
“unjustness” of the surrounding society. The deracinated element in this is also important, not 
just for Freud himself, but for later psychoanalysts who – largely because of their Jewishness, 
but also at times in opposition to authoritarian regimes – have found themselves highly 
mobile and unsettled, traversing boundaries and working across re-forged and reimagined 
identities. Whilst the impact of this on psychoanalytic theory has been mixed, it is arguable 
that the general stance has been one that is open to relationality and otherness in a way that 
echoes (albeit at a critical distance) Levinasian concerns (e.g. Benjamin, 2018). Something 
comes at us from the other and demands not just recognition, but an openness to being 
psychically challenged and changed. This is precisely the “yes and no” of “interruption” as 
“the condition of ethical relationality” to which Butler (2012, p. 5) refers in her comments on 
Jewish thought. 
I have emphasized reasonably contemporary Jewish writings in this article, but before closing 
it is worth noting that there is a huge “classical” back catalogue of Jewish thought that is 
relevant to the question of how to maintain a critical stance towards the social order whilst 
also holding onto what might be termed a psychoanalytic ethic. In some ways, these writings 
can be seen as more “Jewishly traditional” in that the practice of Jewish scholarship is to take 
Biblical texts and their commentaries, usually centuries or even millennia old, and rethink 
them for contemporary concerns. Examples here include Avivah Zornberg’s incisive re-
readings of Biblical texts through psychoanalytic lenses, producing new versions of moral 
engagement (Zornberg, 2009), as well as Levinas’ (1990) brilliantly yet subtly subversive 
Talmudic readings from the 1960s. There is also psychotherapeutic relevance for some of this 
work. For instance, Philip Cushman (2007) claims that the Jewish midrashic tradition (the 
aspect of Jewish thought focusing on interpretation through questions and narratives) might 
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inform contemporary relational psychoanalytic practice – indeed, that it often does so 
unawares, as “[i]n ways that we may not realize, Jewish therapists might be moved by deeply 
felt, embodied ways of being and thus moral commitments that have their origins in ideas and 
social practices hundreds or even thousands of years old and socially transmitted to us in 
ways implicit and constitutive” (p. 82). The substance of this influence is to promote certain 
values (“engagement, historicity, interpersonal interaction, the dialectic of absence and 
presence, the prohibition against idolatry”) and develop “a process of study and authorial 
creation that seems structured to encourage learners to engage with and enact those values, 
which are among the most important concepts in Jewish thought” (p. 53). Cushman’s focus is 
on how these values are congruent to relational psychotherapy, and indeed this may be one 
way in which some of the issues raised here have psychotherapeutic relevance. The Butlerian 
claim that Jewish ethics promotes relationality and openness to alterity is in some respects 
well aligned with relational and intersubjectivist psychoanalysis, as Jessica Benjamin’s 
(2018) work also suggests. Psychotherapy does not necessarily need to be overtly “barbaric” 
to reflect these influences, though it is fair to say that the perspective I have adopted here 
suggests it should resist tendencies to be socially conformist and  also be actively engaged in 
anti-racist and decolonial practices.  
Perhaps, however, there is an even more basic association. The most distinctive characteristic 
of the psychoanalytic formulation of the unconscious, whatever variations there are between 
schools, is its negativity, its opposition, that is, to the structures of rationality that characterize 
conscious mental life. Whatever we think we are doing to create order in the world – to 
colonize the barbarism of nature, both human and physical – is disrupted precisely by that 
barbarism; and this is not an accident or merely a problem to be solved. It is rather a 
recognition of reality; that is, the “reality principle,” which defers gratification and diverts 
pleasure in the name of what is possible, is ironically only part of the true reality of the 
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human subject, in which identities are never fully formed or completely stable (Said’s (2003) 
point) and in which something always works against the grain of settledness and control (this 
being a version of the death drive, but also a simple comment on the subversive nature of 
unconscious life). Politically, psychoanalysis, perhaps like barbarism, insists on the “cruelty” 
of confrontation with reality as it is, however difficult that might be emotionally and also 
philosophically; that is to say, the “barbaric” elements in psychoanalysis and in politics have 
to do with resistance to those reconciliatory comforts that deny the actual suffering and 
oppression surrounding us – the barbarism of “civilized” society itself. In this specific and 
quite precise sense, the unconscious of psychoanalysis is “barbaric” and its Jewishness is part 
of that. Add sexuality and cannibalism, both concerns of psychoanalysis and fantasized 
attributes of the Jewish as well as the racialized “other,” and what is created is the possibility 
of the “community of barbarians” to which Slabodsky (2014, p. 94) claims Levinas 
eventually aspired. Is this over-optimistic? No doubt, again, yes and no. 
There is a tussle going on in Jewish communities worldwide, impacted upon equally by 
Israel’s position as “civilized” in the negative sense that the new barbarianism frames, and by 
antisemitism as it (re-)emerges in Europe and elsewhere. Recovering the Southern tradition, 
as Slabodsky (2014) advocates, is a difficult task in this context; alliance-building between 
Jews and others is sought as an alternative to the assimilatory fantasy of recognition from the 
colonizing authorities, yet is also precarious. Still, here is a wager: the Jewish component of 
psychoanalysis has been central to its development and has fuelled its radical elements much 
more than its conservative ones, notwithstanding various setbacks and complications. This is 
because of the insistent and it seems never to be entirely overcome marginality of the Jews, 
their permanent immersion in “fort-da,” through which they are at times absorbed into the 
body of the social, and at times expelled from it. It is also because there is a long history of 
Jewish barbarism that infiltrates Jewish commitments to disciplines that subvert rather than 
26 
 
confirm normalizing practices, as the case of the critical theorists attests, and hence that are 
set up to embrace other “barbaric” practices, such as those of decolonialism. In this sense, 
psychoanalysis needs and can never escape its Jewish provocations; and in these can be found 
some of the energy with which it is possible for psychoanalysis to contribute to the ongoing 
struggle for a decolonized world.  
About the Author 
Stephen Frosh is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychosocial Studies at 
Birkbeck, University of London. His most recent book is Those Who Come After: 




Arendt, H. (1943/2007) We refugees. In: J. Kohn and R. Feldman (eds.) Hannah Arendt: The 
Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken, pp. 264 –274. 
Arendt, H. (1944/2007) The Jew as pariah: A hidden tradition. In: J. Kohn and R. Feldman 
(eds.) Hannah Arendt: The Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken, pp. 275-297. 
Benjamin, J. (2018) Beyond Doer and Done to: Recognition Theory, Intersubjectivity and the 
Third. London: Routledge. 
Brickman, C. (2003) Aboriginal Populations in the Mind. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Butler, J. (2012) Parting Ways. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Caygill, H. (2002) Levinas and the Political. London: Routledge. 
27 
 
Cheyette, B. (2013) Diasporas of the Mind: Jewish and Postcolonial Writing and the 
Nightmare of History. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Cohen, S. and Kahn-Harris, K. (2004) Beyond Belonging: The Jewish Identities of 
Moderately Engaged British Jews. London: Profile Books. 
Cushman, P. (2007) A burning world, an absent god. Contemporary Psychoanalysis 43(1): 
47–88. 
Damousi, J. and Plotkin, M. (eds.) (2012) Psychoanalysis and Politics: Histories of 
Psychoanalysis Under Conditions of Restricted Political Freedom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Deutscher, I. (1968/2017) The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays. London: Verso. 
Diller, J. (1991) Freud's Jewish Identity: A Case Study in the Impact of Ethnicity. London: 
Associated University Presses. 
Fanon, F. (1952/1967) Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by C.L. Markmann. London: 
Pluto. 
Freud, S. (1900/1953) The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard Edition 4. London: Hogarth 
Press, pp. ix-627. 
Freud, S. (1913/1955) Totem and Taboo. Standard Edition 13. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 
vii-162. 
Freud, S. (1926/1961) Letter from Sigmund Freud to Members of The B’nai B’rith Lodge, 6 
May 1926. Letters of Sigmund Freud 1873–1939. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 366-367. 




Frosh, S. (2005) Hate and the Jewish Science: Anti-Semitism, Nazism and Psychoanalysis. 
London: Palgrave. 
Frosh, S. (2009) Promised land or permitted land: A consideration of Jewish fundamentalism 
in the light of Levinasian ethics. Psychoanalysis and History 11(2): 209–224. 
Frosh, S. (2013) Psychoanalysis, colonialism, racism. Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology 33(3): 141–154. 
Frosh, S. (2017) Primitivity and violence: Traces of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 37(1): 34–47. 
Frosh, S. (2018) Psychoanalysis, politics and society: What remains radical in 
psychoanalysis? In: R. Gipps and M. Lacewing (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 667-686. 
Frosh, S. (2019) Those Who Come After: Postmemory, Acknowledgement and Forgiveness. 
London: Palgrave. 
Gay, P. (1988) Freud: A Life for Our Time. London: Dent. 
Gilman, S. (1993) Freud, Race and Gender. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Greedharry, M. (2008) Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis. London: Palgrave. 
Herzog, A. (2005) Levinas, memory and the art of writing. The Philosophical Forum 36(3): 
333–343. 
Levinas, E. (1963/1990) Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. Translated by S. Hand. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
29 
 
Levinas, E. (1978/1999) Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Translated by A. Lingis. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP.  
Levinas, E. (1990) Nine Talmudic Readings. Translated by A. Aronowicz. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.  
Levinas, E. (1991/1998) Entre Nous: On Thinking of the Other. Translated by M. Smith and 
B. Harshav. London: Athlone.  
Mahler, A. (1946/1968) Gustav Mahler: Memories and Letters. Edited by D. Mitchell. Rev. 
ed. London: John Murray.  
Mignolo, W. (2000) Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and 
Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rose, J. (2011) Proust Among the Nations: From Dreyfus to the Middle East. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Said, E. (1978) Orientalism. London: Pantheon.  
Said, E. (1979) Zionism from the standpoint of its victims. In: M. Bayoumi and A. Rubin 
(eds.) (2001) The Edward Said Reader. London: Granta.  
Said, E. (2003) Freud and the Non-European. London: Verso. 
Sharit, A. (2000) An interview with Edward Said. 
https://politicsandculture.org/2010/08/10/an-interview-with-edward-said-2/, accessed 2 
January 2020.  




Stonebridge, L. (2019) Placeless People: Writing, Rights and Refugees. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Traverso, E. (2016) The End of Jewish Modernity. London: Pluto Press. 
Vyrgioti, M. (2018) The Cannibal Trope: A Psychosocial Critique of Psychoanalysis’ 
Colonial Fantasies. Unpublished PhD thesis. Birkbeck, University of London. 
Young-Bruehl, E. (1996) The Anatomy of Prejudices. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Zornberg, A. (2009) The Murmuring Deep: Reflections on the Biblical Unconscious. New 
York: Schocken. 
